Trump’s Tariffs: Predictions and Strategy

6–9 minutes

We recently added a detailed page — Trump Tariff Strategy: When and How Duties Can Be Imposed — that goes well beyond the news updates we post here. If you are an importer trying to understand not just what the current tariffs are but how they work, how long they last, and what is coming next, that page is worth reading in full. This post summarizes the key points and adds context from developments since it was first published.

Can We Predict What Trump Will Do on Tariffs?

The honest answer is: we can predict there will be tariffs. The timing, the rates, the countries targeted, and the legal authority used are genuinely uncertain — and the pace of change through 2025 and into 2026 has made conventional planning extremely difficult. What we have seen is an administration willing to use multiple legal mechanisms in sequence, sometimes within days of each other, and to escalate and de-escalate rapidly in response to negotiations, court rulings, and political developments.

The February 20, 2026 Supreme Court ruling striking down the IEEPA-based reciprocal tariffs as unlawful is the most dramatic example of how quickly the landscape can shift. Within hours of the ruling, the administration announced it would pivot to other statutory authorities to maintain the tariff structure. The tariffs did not go away — they changed legal clothing.

How Long Will the Tariffs Last?

This depends entirely on which authority underlies a given tariff. Some tariffs are more durable than others, and understanding the difference matters for long-term planning.

Section 232 tariffs — imposed on national security grounds after a formal Commerce Department investigation — have proven the most durable. The steel and aluminum tariffs from Trump’s first term survived the Biden administration and remain in place today at elevated rates. These tariffs do not expire automatically and require an affirmative presidential action to remove. Importers should treat Section 232 tariffs as essentially permanent for planning purposes.

Section 301 tariffs on Chinese goods have similarly proven sticky. They have been in place since 2018, survived a change of administration, and were expanded in 2024. The rates on specific products have changed, but the underlying structure has not gone away.

IEEPA-based tariffs — the reciprocal tariffs and the fentanyl-related tariffs on Canada, Mexico, and China — were the most aggressive and the most legally fragile. The Supreme Court’s February 2026 ruling struck them down, and while the administration moved quickly to replace them under other authorities, there is now a live question about refunds for duties paid under IEEPA. Importers who paid IEEPA reciprocal tariffs should be documenting their entries carefully and consulting counsel about protest and refund options.

The Full Toolkit: Every Tariff Authority the President Can Use

Most importers became familiar with Section 301 and Section 232 during Trump’s first term. The second term has introduced — or threatened to introduce — a much wider range of statutory tools. Here is what each one does and why it matters:

Section 232 — National Security Tariffs

Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 authorizes the President to restrict imports of any product that the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security determines threatens to impair national security. The process requires a formal BIS investigation and report before tariffs can be imposed, but the administration has been moving through investigations at an accelerated pace — the copper investigation, for example, went from initiation to tariff proclamation in 144 days. Active Section 232 investigations currently cover pharmaceuticals, semiconductors (resulting in a January 2026 proclamation), critical minerals, commercial aircraft, polysilicon, wind turbines, drones, robotics, and medical equipment. Section 232 tariffs are the most legally durable of all the available tools and are explicitly unaffected by the SCOTUS IEEPA ruling.

Section 301 — Unfair Trade Practices

Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the USTR to investigate and respond to foreign government trade practices that are unreasonable, discriminatory, or burden U.S. commerce. This is the authority behind the existing China tariffs. A Section 301 investigation takes time — typically several months even on an expedited basis — but the resulting tariffs are legally solid and have withstood years of court challenges. Following the SCOTUS IEEPA ruling, the administration announced new Section 301 investigations targeting additional countries, with the intent of converting those into tariffs once the investigation process is complete. Section 301 tariffs can stack on top of Section 232 tariffs, unlike the IEEPA reciprocal tariffs which were subject to anti-stacking rules.

Section 122 — Balance of Payments Emergency

Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 allows the President to impose tariffs of up to 15% on any country or group of countries to address a “large and serious” balance-of-payments deficit. No formal investigation is required — only a presidential determination that the deficit exists. The critical limitation is time: Section 122 tariffs expire automatically after 150 days unless Congress votes to extend them. The statute has never been used before. Within hours of the SCOTUS IEEPA ruling on February 20, 2026, President Trump invoked Section 122 to impose a 10% global baseline tariff — later raised to 15% — to maintain continuity while Section 301 investigations are conducted. Whether Section 122 is legally valid in the current economic environment is already being contested: several economists and trade law experts argue that the U.S. does not have a true balance-of-payments deficit under a floating exchange rate system, which would undermine the legal predicate for using this authority. Expect litigation.

Section 338 — Discrimination Against U.S. Commerce

Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 — the same Smoot-Hawley Act that helped deepen the Great Depression — authorizes the President to impose tariffs of up to 50% on imports from countries that discriminate against U.S. commerce. The statute has not been used since 1949 and has never been tested in modern courts. Its key ambiguities: whether a formal ITC investigation is required, what counts as “discrimination,” and how it interacts with WTO obligations. The administration has identified Section 338 as a potential tool for imposing higher tariffs on specific countries — particularly where Section 122’s 15% ceiling is insufficient and Section 232 or 301 investigations are not yet complete. Because it has never been litigated in the modern trade law context, both its reach and its limits are genuinely undefined.

Section 201 — Safeguard Tariffs

Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 — sometimes called the “escape clause” — allows the President to impose temporary safeguard tariffs when the International Trade Commission finds that a surge in imports is causing serious injury to a domestic industry. Unlike Section 232, which focuses on national security, Section 201 focuses on economic injury to U.S. producers. The process requires an ITC investigation and finding, and the resulting tariffs are designed to give domestic industries time to adjust. Trump used Section 201 in his first term for solar panels and washing machines. Safeguard tariffs are time-limited but can be extended.

Section 1702 (IEEPA) — Now Struck Down

This is the authority the administration used for the reciprocal tariffs and the fentanyl-related tariffs on Canada, Mexico, and China. The Supreme Court ruled 6-3 on February 20, 2026 that IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs. Those tariffs are now legally void, though the practical mechanics of refunds remain to be worked out by the Court of International Trade. Section 232 and Section 301 tariffs are unaffected.

What This Means for Importers Right Now

The SCOTUS ruling did not end the tariff era — it changed its legal foundation. The administration is actively rebuilding its tariff structure under Section 122 (temporary), Section 301 (investigations underway), and Section 232 (multiple active investigations). The practical result for most importers is that tariff exposure remains high and the specific rates and coverage are in flux. Several things are worth doing now regardless of how the legal picture evolves:

  • Document your IEEPA entries. Importers who paid reciprocal tariffs under IEEPA may have refund claims available. The window and process are not yet fully defined, but entries should be identified and preserved.
  • Review classification. How a product is classified under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule determines which tariff rates apply. Misclassification in either direction creates exposure. A classification review can sometimes identify legitimate duty savings or flag compliance risks before CBP does.
  • Consider binding rulings. A CBP binding ruling locks in a classification or country-of-origin determination, giving importers certainty in an uncertain environment.
  • Evaluate sourcing. For products facing stacked Section 301 and Section 232 duties, the math on alternative sourcing from non-Chinese origins has changed significantly. Country-of-origin rules and substantial transformation analysis matter here.
  • Watch the Section 301 investigations. New USTR investigations announced post-SCOTUS ruling could result in tariffs on products and countries not previously covered. The comment periods in those investigations are an opportunity to participate and potentially shape the outcome.

Need Help Navigating the Tariffs?

Great Lakes Customs Law has been advising importers since 2010. We have helped hundreds of clients reduce, challenge, and plan around tariffs across multiple administrations. The current environment is the most complex we have seen. Call our Michigan office at (734) 855-4999 or our Chicago office at (773) 920-1840, or reach us using the contact options on this page.

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